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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
CONNIE 0. STONE,

Defendant-Appellant,

- vs. THE STATE OF UTAH,

Case No.
10650

Plaintiff-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Connie 0. Stone, former Recorder of Layton City, appeals her conviction for
misuse of public monies in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-28-59 (1953).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged by information
filed in the District Court of Davis County with the
crimes of embezzlement and misuse of public
funds. Trial was had, during which the embezzlement charge was apparently dismissed, and appellant was convicted of the crime of misuse of public
funds.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits the conviction should
be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The general statement of facts set forth in th~
appellant's brief is reasonably adequate for the purpose of this appeal. Respondent, however, desires
to point out the following facts:
The appellant, Connie Stone, was Layton CHy
Recorder on or about October 12, 1964. A sum ol
$2,549.21 was found missing from the Layton Cit/'
receipts covering sewer, water, swimming pool, '
housing, and other funds that the appellant had
custody over during the period when the funds
were apparently taken by a "lapping process." (T •
30, 98, 102).
i
1

1

The appellant expressly acknowledged that she
was Layton City Recorder and that her duties and
responsibilities during the time in question included
handling money from various accounts and that she
handled substantial sums of the city's monies (T. 349·
353). The City Administrator also acknowledged that
the appellant made bank deposits of city monies in
many instances and was responsible for handling
and depositing the city funds (T. 12, 14).
It further appeared that during the time the so·
called lapping occurred, appellant would individ·
ually handle the city funds and make the deposits,
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and an audit for the period disclosed the loss ending
on October 12, 1964, when the system apparently
broke down because appellant ceased handling the
funds.
Appellant makes no challenge to the sufficiency
on evidence of her misappropriation and indeed
none could be made. The facts recited are material
to the only issues raised by the appellant on appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE DISCLOSED APPELLANT WAS A
PROPER PERSON TO BE CHARGED WITH THE MISUSE OF PUBLIC FUNDS IN VIOLATION OF UTAH
CODE ANN.§ 76-28-59 (1953).

The evidence clearly shows appellant was the
Layton City Recorder and while acting in that capacity received funds from various sources which
she kept as Layton City monies. It further discloses
that the city lost funds which appellant had the duty
to deposit to the City account in a local bank. The
essence of the appellant's argument is that since she
had no express statutory duty to receive and deposit
city monies she could not be convicted under the
Provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-59 (1953) as an
officer of a city "charged with the receipt, safekeeping, transfer or disbursement of public monies" who
misappropriated them to her own use.
It is submitted that the construction urged by
appellant is an overly narrow one. She would ask
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this Court to construe the statute as meaning an oi
ficer charged "by statute or ordinance." The statu.'.o
does not say this but says only that the officer mus:
be a person "charged with the receipt, safekeep\na
transfer or disbursement of public monies." The ke1·
word for interpretation in this case is the word
"charge." Does this mean charged by statute or
ordinance, or obligated in some other fashions. ln
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary at 140 (196!),
the word "charge" is noted to be commensurate
with obligation or responsibility. Judicial constructions in other contexts have interpreted the word
"charged" to mean given responsibility or obl\gation. Conference of Major Religious Superiors ol
Women v. District of Columbia. 348 F.2d 783 (D. C.
Cir. 1965). "Charge" is often used synonymously ·
with custody, State v. Clark. 86 Me. 194, 29 Atl. 984 •.
(1893). It is submitted that this is an appropriate construction for the instant statute and in keeping with
its plain meaning. Every officer who is obligated or
has custody of public funds, whether the source ol
the custody or obligation comes from statute, ordinance, or general obligation because of the nature
of the person's assumed responsibilities should be
a person "charged with the receipt, safekeeping,
transfer or disbursement" of public funds properly
in his custody. The word "charged" should not be
limited to persons charged by an express statutory
obligation, but must necessarily encompass publlc
custodianship resulting from the obligations of the
office.
1

1
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The Utah statute is comparable to Cal. Pen. Code
424 (West Supp. 1966). In People v. Pearson, 11 Cal.
App. 2d 123, 52 P.2d 971 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936), the
court ruled their provision was applicable to an em·
ployee in the sales tax division of the State Board of
Equalization even though there apparently was no
express statutory or other requirement that the em·
ployee receive public funds, but the duty was imposed by the nature of his employment.
The case of McMillin v. Emery. 59 Utah 553, 205
Pac. 892 (1922), does not warrant a contrary construction of the statute since in that case the Court expressly found that a deputy county treasurer was a
person charged with the safekeeping of public
monies because a statute expressly imposed on him
the same obligations as the treasurer. Anything else
in the opinion is the grossest form of dicta. However, the basic premise that some of the dicta of McMillin is based, that penal statutes are to be narrowly construed to the subject described therein is not
an applicable principle for two reasons: (1) the
statute does encompass persons charged with safekeeping public funds and is not by its express terms
limited to those charged by law and "law" is not
limited to statute or ordinance, and (2) Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-2 (1953) expressly rejects the concept of
narrow construction of penal statutes and requires
that they be construed "according to the fair import
of their terms" and to "effect the objects of the
statutes and to promote justice."
Taking the above axiom of construction, the interpretation urged by appellant is not proper since
!
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the intent of Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-59 (1953) w~s
to protect the public treasury and public funds. The
construction urged by appellant would have the
opposite effect. The same may be said for the de.
cision of State v. Meyers, 56 Ohio St. 340, 47 N.E. 13~
(1897), cited by appellant and referred to in the Mc.
Millin case.
Secondly, it is submitted that there was sufli.
cient legal obligation imposed on the appellant as
Layton City Recorder to sustain the conviction even
if the ultraconservative construction of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-28-59 (1953) urged by appellant is accepted.
Utah Const. art. XIII,§ 8 provides:
The making of profit out of public monies, or
using the same for any purpose not authorized by
law, by any public officer, shall be deemed a felony,
and shall be punished as provided by law, but part
of such punishment shall be disqualification to hold
public office.

Thus, appellant, who is clearly a public officer
(cf. Utah Code Ann.§ 10-6-30 (1962)) was obligatednot
to use the fees collected for her own use, but to put
them to their public charge. In failing to do so she
committed a constitutional felony since the above
section is self-executing and also imposes a legal
obligation on the appellant.
The testimony before the trial court clearly
shows appellant received receipts and fees paid by
citizens for water, sewer, rental, and other services.
Utah Const. art. XXL § 2 also provides:
But all other State, district, county, city, town
and school officers, shall be required by law to keep
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true and correct account of all fees collected by

them, and to pay the same into the proper treasury ....

Thus, appellant was legally obligated by the above
constitutional provisions to pay the fees coming into
hor hands over to the city treasury, which she did
not do. Neither of the above cited sections were involved in McMillin since there was a statute directly
applicable to the official therein involved, nor were
the above provisions argued in the Warden's brief.
Certainly, the Constitution provides an adequate
basis upon which to say a city recorder is obligated
to keep funds received by him.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 (1962) authorizes cities
to pass ordinances for the general welfare of its
citizens and the preservation of city property. The
city council by ordinance can regulate duties and
obligations of city personnel towards city funds. The
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-10-60, -63, -71, -73
0962) are not exclusive and a recorder may be required to perform other duties not inconsistent with
law. As noted in appellant's brief, section 3-27 of the
Layton City Ordinances requires the city recorder
to pay into the treasury all monies coming into his
hands by virtue of his office. Other provisions of the
Ordinances required the recorder to receive and
keep proper custody of Layton City funds, 3-28-34
Layton City Ordinances. These Ordinances are not
inconsistent with State law since they can be construed as requiring the Recorder to account for
funds he receives by virtue of his office. Appellant
says none of the funds she received came by virtue
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of her office. To the contrary, the evidence of recor"
clearly demonstrates she received the monies she
took only by virtue of duties she was performing as
Layton City Recorder. Consequently, there is no
merit to appellant's contention.
• 0

Finally, it is submitted that if Utah Code Ann.:
76-28-59 (1953) is going to be construed as meaning
"charged according to law" and the Court rejects
what has been noted above, the term law may be
construed to mean the whole body of law of Utah
including the common law. The rule is clear tha1
public officers receiving public funds in the course
of their employment have a duty to keep them
safely. 43 Am. Jur. Public Officers § 309 (1942). This
duty is judicially imposed in part by common law
principle. Matter of Bird v. McGoldrick. 277 N.Y
492, 14 N.E. 2d 805 (1938); cf. 2 Bishop, Criminal Law
§§ 328, 329 (9th ed. 1923). In Regina v. Baxter. 5 Cox.
302 (1851), a police superintendent was charged with
embezzlement as a public officer of funds he was
not entitled to receive as a police superintendent,
but which he received because of the administrative
practice of handling the funds. The court, although
not passing on the issue directly because of a flaw
in the indictment, indicated there may be a sufficient
constructive receipt of the funds to warrant prosecu·
tion. In any event it is submitted there was a suffi·
cient obligation on the part of the appellant as city
recorder to have imposed a public charge on her
to safeguard the funds she received, and she could
be criminally liable under the applicable statute foT
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having violated her charge imposed by the law of
fiduciary relationships.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN
THE INSTRUCTIONS IT GAVE TO THE JURY.

The appellant contends the trial court committed
prejudicial error in giving instructions numbers one
and five, subsections one and two. It is submitted
there is no merit to the position.
First, no exception was taken to the instructions
given by the court. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the failure to raise exceptions to instructions given precludes review on appeal unless the
instructions are so obviously prejudicial that a fair
trail could not be had. Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-1
0953); State v. Cobo, 90 Utah 89, 60 P.2d 952 (1936).
Since no exception was taken to the instructions, no
claim of prejudicial error can now be raised as the
instructions given were in no way so defective as to
support the exception to the requirement of an exception as articulated in the Cobo case.
Instruction number one merely advises the jury
of the nature of the charge against the appellant.
No place in the argument portion of the appellant's
brief is there any explanation of why instruction
number one was not appropriate. Consequently,
there can be no basis for a claim of error by the trial
court in giving instruction number one.
Instruction number five, subsections one and
two, of which the appellant complains, charged that
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before the jury could find the appellant guilty thev
must have found beyond a reasonable doubt (a)
that appellant was the Layton City Recorder and (bi
that she was charged with the receipt, safekeepinq
transfer, and disbursement of public monies. Cer
tainly one of the facts the jury had to find was th 2
appellant was the Layton City Recorder because the
information charged that her misappropriation occurred while she was serving in that capacity. Appellant's basic contention was that the jury was
instructed that they must find whether appellanl
was charged with the receipt of safekeeping o!
public monies. Appellant contends this is an issue .
of law and the court should have instructed that she
was or was not so obligated. Whether the issue was
one of law or fact depends on the construction to be
given Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-59 ( 1953). If the ap
pellant's contention is correct that the Layton City
Recorder is not so obligated as the provisions ol
Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-59 (1953) require, a directed
verdict was in order. If she was so charged, submitting the issue to the jury as a question of fact could
not have been prejudicial to the appellant since: (1)
If appellant was charged with the obligation towards
the public monies as a matter of law by instructing
the jury that they had to so find, the court merely
gave the jury an opportunity to determine the issue
in appellant's favor rather than have the court directly advise the jury against appellant, and (2) iL
as one of the theories of construction of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-28-59 (1953) advanced by respondent is cor
rect, that the obligation for the funds need not arise
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by law or statute but because the relationship of the
officer to the funds, the issue would be one of fact
and properly submitted to the jury on that basis. In
either event the instruction could not have prejudiced the appellant.

Finally, appellant notes that in instruction number four, wherein the court instructed the jury in the
language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-59 (1953), the
court left out the words "or every other person." The
elimination of these words was the elimination of
unnecessary verbage. The appellant was charged
in the information as an officer of Layton City, not
as an otherwise unidentified person. Consequently,
by not giving the unnecessary language the court
more properly tailored the statutory language to the
case before the jury. This was a proper action for
the trial court to take. State v. Thompson, 110 Utah
113, 170 P.2d 153 (1946).
The allegations of error in the trial court's instructions are in no way supportive of a claim for
reversal.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN RULING ON THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE.

The appellant contends that in twelve instances
the trial court received evidence without proper
foundation, but then goes on to cite only three claims
in her brief. Therefore, it must be concluded that ail
the other claimed evidentiary errors are abandoned.
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The first objection goes to the admission of Ex
hibit B. The record reflects State's Exhibit B to be
the original of deposit slips kept by the First National
Bank of Layton as part of their records and were 30
identified by a bank officer (T. 69). The officer als,
identified the deposit slips as having the depos!l
number of Layton City on them. The officer of the
bank was able to identify each slip as part of the
bank records by an initial on each slip (R. 70). Th2
exhibits were offered, and objected to, and admitted
without conditions (R. 72). The court then held an
out-of-court hearing where counsel for appellar:'.
further defined his objection to the exhibit because .
of some markings by the F.B.I. laboratory and an ·
order that the Layton City police were to have
turned the exhibit over to the court (R. 73, 74). The
objection was apparently only as to chain of custody.
The court overruled the objection and gave appellant the right to renew the objection. It was not renewed, and thus must be deemed abandoned. In
McCormick, Evidence § 58 (1954) it is noted:
... the everyday method of handling the situation
when the adversary objects to the relevancy or the
competency of the offered fact is to permit it to
come in conditionally, upon the assurance, express
or implied, of the offering counsel that he will 'connect up' the tendered evidence by proving, in the
later progress of his case, the missing facts.
In a long trial, however, where the witnesses
are many and the facts complex, it is easy for the
offering counsel to forgd the need for making the
required 'connecting' proof, and for the judge and
the adversary to fail to observe this gam in the
evidence. Who invokes the condition subsequent,
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upon such breach? The burden is placed upon the
objecting party to renew the objection and invoke
the condition.... [Emphasis added. J

Since appellant did not renew her objection,
the matter must be deemed abandoned and no claim
of error can be had. Further, the exhibit was admissible as a business record since the only showing
of a break in custody was appellant counsel's statement. Finally, the evidence otherwise contained in
the exhibit was before the jury in other documents
(see exhibits D & A) and hence no prejudice could
occur.
Exhibit 0 was identified as a monthly transmittal of Layton City's retirement and group insurance
for January and February, 1965 (T. 145). The handwriting on the exhibit was appellant's (T. 145). Exhibit P was an employee withholding exemption
certificate also bearing appellant's signature (T. 146).
Exhibit Q was an analysis of employees' gross earnings (T. 146). It was identified as prepared by the
appellant (T. 146). The documents were admitted
again subject to connecting up as to materiality (T.
147). On cross-examination appellant's counsel
proved the items to have been taken from the Layton City files. No subsequent motion was made to
strike and it does not appear that they in any way
would confuse the issues otherwise before the
court. There could be no claim of prejudice for lack
of reasonable foundation or claim of prejudice because of gross immateriality that might have inflamed the jury. Indeed nowhere in appellant's brief
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is there any explanation of how any prejudice could
have occurred on any of the items of evidence.
Exhibit V was a carbon copy of a bank deposli
slip of Layton City identified as prepared by Mau.
rine Thurston (T. 208). The word "October" was writ·
ten on the slip, but counsel indicated he did not
I
know who put that notation on it. The court struck
any reference to the written non-carbon portion ol
the exhibit (T. 210). The witness who identified the
exhibit was a Layton City employee. The exhibit
was otherwise relevant. Maurine Thurston during 1
her testimony identified exhibit V as a carbon bank
deposit slip apparently of Layton City (T. 267). She
acknowledged preparing it. She testified the deposlt
slip was made out during the relevant period in
question (T. 268). She said it was in October, 1964,
when she started to make out deposit slips (T. 268,
269). On objection to the offer of the exhibit that it
was not identified as to date, the court noted what
had been established and that the approximate date
was established from her testimony (T. 270). Con·
cerning the objection as to the word "October" on
the exhibit, the court in keeping with its previous
ruling admitted it but it was offered without ref·
erence to the word "October" (T. 271). No subsequent motion to strike was made. Since the wit·
nesses testimony as to the time of preparation of the
exhibit was before the court, and it was expressly
offered without reference to the notation of "October," there is no basis by which appellant can
complain of any error.
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The instant trial was long and many objections
of a technical and argumentative nature faced the
trial court. He handled them well and did not exceed
the limits of his discretion. No showing of substantia.l prejudice to the rights of appellant had been
demonstrated and therefore no basis for reversal
exists. Utah Code Ann. § 77-41-1 (1953).
CONCLUSION
This appeal presents only one real issue for consideration by this Court and that is the appropriate
construction to be given to Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-59
(] 953), in light of the facts of this case. The other
claims of error are of innocuous propositions containing no jurisprudential significance.
The respondent submits that the one major issue
is so structured on this appeal that in any event, no
matter how Utah Code Ann. § 76-28-59 (1953) is construed the conviction must be affirmed. However,
the respondent submits that that statute should be
construed with reasonable latitude since the real intention of the Legislature was to protect the public
treasury.
This Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
Attorney for PlaintiffRespondent
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

